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Abstract
In Tabasco, in the Mexican Gulf of Mexico, many small-scale fishers follow their catch to prohibited offshore areas set aside for
the oil industry’s extractive activities. They claim that increased seismic studies and oil extraction displace and kill fish,
contributing to a reduction in hauls, which acts as an incentive to the fishers to continue accessing traditional fishing grounds
in the recently prohibited areas. The author draws on theoretical ideas from de la Cadena and Ingold to examine the fishers’
offshore movement and related knowledge claims as ‘excess’, or beyond conventional political discourses, interrogating the
multiple and contested meanings that fishers attach to their sea environment, fish and fishing in the context of increased oil
extraction operations. The article shows that these meanings are difficult to articulate within a political frame that constitutes the
offshore extraction area as a ‘sacrifice zone’. However, the respective knowledges of fishers and the oil industry about the
industry’s impacts on marine life rely on patchy evidence, lack systematicity, and are motivated by political interests. The author
argues that scientific indeterminacy about the causes of depleting fish populations and the weakness of environmental legislation
exclude fishers’ knowledge from politics while recognising the oil industry’s knowledge as valid.
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Introduction: fishers at sacrifice zone
It’s a scorching early July afternoon ten kilometres off
the coast of Southern Tabasco in the Gulf of Mexico. I
have joined Carlos, a licensed fish entrepreneur, and
three unlicensed sea fishers – Henri, Juan and Manuel,
who work for Carlos – on a fishing trip. The horizon
ahead of us is dotted with oil platforms. The three fishers
know them all by their location. They tie their open
fibreglass boat to a small platform next to ‘Tsimin’. A
major platform, symbolically christened with a Mayan
name like all Petróleos Mexicanos’s Gulf of Mexico
platforms, Tsimin sits majestically atop large subsoil
fields of oil and gas that belong to the new oil produc-
tion project ‘Coastal Tabasco’. As sizeable waves beat
against the boat, soaking us all, the men swiftly release
their hooked long lines into the water. They know
that, like the Gulf’s large coral reefs, the oil plat-
forms’ reef-like environment also attracts fish and
therefore fishers, many of whom are defying recent
governmental restrictions on marine traffic in their
attempt to make a living. In a bare-handed, silent
choreography, the men briskly begin to pull in their
long lines, hauling out banderas (gafftopsail catfish)
with long venomous spines, which twist and jump in
the air in a surprised fight for their lives. Later, the
men tell me that knowledge of the movement of
banderas, guachinangos (red snapper) and other
commercially important sea fish has long been dis-
puted between fishers and the oil industry. I have
earlier learned that, in 2003, an area of 15,900 km2
in the Gulf was closed to fishing, ostensibly to pro-
tect the oil industry from ‘potential acts of terror-
ism’. While the Mexican government and the oil
industry blame fishers for breaching security restric-
tions and overexploiting the fish, fishers say that
increased seismic studies and oil spills displace and
kill marine inhabitants, threatening their way of life
(Author’s fieldnotes, 2011 and 2012).
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The offshore waters of the Gulf of Mexico provide a
sociospatially distinct environment for various extractive op-
erations, away from the immediate observation of most people
on shore. However, small-scale fishers’ travels in pursuit of
the fish extend from the coastline to nearly 200 km offshore.
For the fishers, livelihoods and life are based on movement
around, within and beyond the Gulf of Mexico’s oil-
production areas. But from the perspective of oil industry
actors and fisheries and environmental officials, the fishers
constitute ‘trouble’ as they transgress spatial restrictions de-
signed to protect the oil industry and fishing prohibitions de-
signed to protect specific fish species.
Ethnographic studies of maritime livelihoods have com-
monly focused on fishing instead of other maritime activities
(Acheson 1981; Helmreich 2011; Pálsson 1994), with many
recent studies examining relations between fishers, the state
and conservation agencies in the management of commercial
fishing at various scales (Lyons et al. 2016; Pauwelussen
2016). However, the ways in which economically important
and politically powerful extractive industries impact on ma-
rine ecology and shape the livelihoods of coastal communities
have received much less attention. Currently, 33% of the
world’s oil is extracted offshore, and both that and deep-sea
mining are increasing, accompanied by multiple impacts on
marine ecologies and seafaring communities (Maribus 2014).
Political ecologies of oil extraction have recently drawn
attention to the role of oil extraction and its infrastructure in
shaping the governance of people and the environment (Appel
2012; Barry 2013). However, while these analyses have illus-
trated how oil’s spatial configuration often protects the indus-
try and makes it difficult for popular movements to influence
politics (Arroyo and Zalik 2016;Mitchell 2011), we know less
about how coastal dwellers manage their everyday activities in
terms of offshore operations. This article focuses on two im-
portant and understudied aspects of seafaring communities’
living with oil: fishers’ offshore movement in oil-production
areas and their related knowledge about the industry’s impacts
on fish. I also examine the difficulty of articulating this knowl-
edge with political narratives that are recognised in formal
arenas of conflict over access to the sea involving fishing
and oil governance.
I follow fishers’movements in coastal and offshore areas to
illustrate how their knowledge claims about the impacts of oil
extraction on fish are informed by a closeness to the sea envi-
ronment, constituted through such movement. I further exam-
ine how their claims are ignored in politics, allowing offshore
waters to be regarded as a ‘sacrifice zone’ and validating the
oil industry’s evidence of impacts of their activities. My ap-
proach draws primarily on theorisations of human-
environment relations and radical alterity proposed by anthro-
pologists with an orientation towards science and technology
studies (de la Cadena 2015; Ingold 2011), while analysis of
fishers is informed by Ingold’s understanding of movement
and change as essential to sociality and life (Ingold 2011:
148). Indeed, Ingold observes that it is only through move-
ment in the environment that humans (and other living beings)
exist as social beings. Hence, to understand how fishers,
whose lives are based on movement, ‘live with oil’, we need
to follow how they move in the sea environment where oil is
extracted.
Since their patterns of movement produce, shape, and ex-
press their relations with their environment, I also focus on an
important difference between how fishers themselves describe
and manifest their connections with their surroundings, and
how their leaders, the oil industry and governmental actors
frame them in political discourse. My analysis follows
Marisol de la Cadena’s theorisation of human-environment
relations as ‘excess’ (de la Cadena 2010; de la Cadena 2015;
Stengers 2005), which she conceptualises as ‘something
which is performed past Bthe limit^’, meaning that it lies out-
side generic public framings of a given phenomenon, and is
therefore non-existent and non-accessible through conven-
tional understandings—in this case those concerning human-
environment relations. Based on her fieldwork in Peru, de la
Cadena (2015) suggests that the dimension of people’s know-
ing and being in their environment, which transcends the mod-
ern nature-culture divide, remains beyond being verbalised as
recognisable or acceptable narratives in formal arenas of pol-
itics. Likewise, among Tabascan fishers, the embodiedness of
their seafaring way of life simply cannot be articulated in
words, much less in political claims.
In the study of fishers and oil, conceptualising fishers’
lifeworlds as excess within the political sphere assists in
analysing how fishers deal with living in the context of extrac-
tive politics. In Tabasco, fisher leaders operate as mediators
between fishers’ claims and politics, reshaping difficult-to-ar-
ticulate, embodied knowledge into more readily comprehen-
sible political narratives. Attention to this mediation work
identifies what remains as excess: that which cannot be incor-
porated into Tabasco’s resource-access politics. Based on my
findings, I also suggest that the fishers’way of life may reveal
ecological practices that constitute alternatives to current heg-
emonic modes of governing the world’s oceans through inten-
sified marine spatial planning (Boucquey et al. 2016).
The practices of fishing and of oil extraction involve com-
peting valuations of the sea environment. The fishers’ sea-
bound movement and their resulting knowledge claims do
not adhere to requirements set for legitimate knowledge or
for politics. At the same time, the politics of oil construe the
Gulf of Mexico production areas as a sacrifice zone necessary
for economic progress, and demand of participants in politics
a particular rhetoric for claiming access to it. Recent discus-
sions concerning sacrifice zones among environmental justice
scholars and others (Klein 2014; Lerner 2010; Morrone and
Buckley 2011; Valenzuela Pérez 2016) highlight how political
narratives about the necessity of development draw on a more
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or less implicit imperative of sacrificing less valuable forms of
life. Within the politics of extraction, this poignantly moral
logic implies that the idea of development as shared, greater
good inherently demands sacrifice. In the Gulf of Mexico’s
offshore space, ‘development’ is enabled through actions of
enclosure and securitisation of the oil-production areas.
Consequently, access and social monitoring are constrained,
and social and environmental harm are externalised in these
locations. Furthermore, the weak legal framework regulating
the oil industry’s environmental impacts and political-
scientific controversy about the impacts of extraction compli-
cate efforts to challenge the expansion of extraction, thereby
facilitating the degradation of the marine environment and of
small-scale fishers’ livelihoods. While on-land oil extraction
requires environmental impact assessment, the legislation that
regulates environmental impact assessment in offshore extrac-
tion is not able to effectively regulate and prevent environ-
mental harm (Vidal Hernández et al. 2012).
As a narrative, the ‘development’ brought by oil—and the
implicit socio-environmental sacrifice this requires—has a
long history in Mexico’s media and among its politicians
and the wider populace (Ferry 2005: 211; Quist and Rinne
2017). Since the nationalisation of oil by President Lázaro
Cárdenas in 1938, the narrative has valued oil as a patrimonial
resource and a symbol of national pride. The popularity of the
narrative of oil as patrimony among Mexicans has also com-
plicated efforts by social movements to raise discussion about
wide-scale environmental contamination caused by the oil in-
dustry (Quist and Nygren 2015; Zalik 2006). However, with
declining oil production and decaying infrastructure,
Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto introduced in 2014
an energy reform to privatise the oil industry. With the
privatisation of the patrimonial asset, public protests against
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), currently the world’s tenth
biggest oil company, have surged, and may undermine the
patrimony narrative (Olivares and Gómez 2017).
At the same time as popular criticism of PEMEX has in-
creased in Mexico, questions about the social and environ-
mental sustainability of marine resource extraction in
Tabasco’s coastal areas have been raised. After a 13-year con-
flict between fishers and the oil industry over access to sea
space, during which catches have substantially decreased,
President Peña Nieto announced in 2016 a federal plan to
reopen to thousands of fishers an area of 10,000 km2, part of
the 15,900-km2 securitised zone of exclusion (Comisión
Nacional de Pesca 2016), to boost a local coastal economy
that has suffered the effects of the oil industry’s recent decline.
Peña Nieto also declared that a study of the Gulf’s marine life
and fishing practices would be carried out (Comisión
Nacional de Pesca 2016) to reconsider access policies in the
oil-production area. However, concerns have been raised that
state authorities do not possess systematic knowledge of ma-
rine fish stocks as they have not been studied for 10 years
(Editorial Staff and Delgado 2016; Martínez 2017), and new
studies by the National Fisheries Institute (Instituto Nacional
de Pesca) will not be finalised before June 2018 (correspon-
dence with SAGARPA, 2017). Furthermore, the plans for
reopening the exclusion zone for fishing have been made pub-
lic concurrently with the oil industry’s expansion into new
areas in the Gulf of Mexico (Televisa 2017). The intensifica-
tion of oil extraction has been carried out without examining
the social and ecological viability of the two industries’
coexistence.
The focus of this paper is the disjuncture between the fish-
ers’movement-bound knowledge and the logic of sacrifice, in
a context where law and politics allow profound scientific
indeterminacy about the impact of seismology and pollution
associated with oil production to matter in specific ways.
Globally, recognition of the environmental and health risks
of oil has long been heavily influenced by uncertainty and
controversy (Auyero and Swistun 2009; Lerner 2010;
Sawyer 2016). In the case of highly complex marine ecosys-
tems, it is difficult to distinguish between oil industry-related
and other factors of environmental degradation. This is partic-
ularly the case for seismological studies, which are limited and
inconclusive. For example, recent studies about the relation
between seismic exploration and fish behaviour suggest that
the noise of airguns used in seismology disrupts fish behav-
iour and may harm the hearing and reproductive cycles of
several marine species (Payne et al. 2012; Paxton et al.
2017). Furthermore, there is no scientific literature on the
long-term impacts of seismic exploration on ecosystems
(Paxton et al. 2017). In Tabasco, the scientific indeterminacy
of possible impacts of seismological exploration inevitably
creates room for struggles over legitimate knowledge about it.
The following section provides the context of Tabasco’s
fisher communities and oil extraction, and documents the
methodology employed in this study. Thereafter, I show how
fishers constitute their daily aquatic lives through their rela-
tions with the environment while the legislative politics and
oil industry actors’ narratives of oil constitute Tabasco as a
sacrifice zone. I go on to discuss how fishers’ claims for sea
space are connected to their sea-bound lives, arguing that the
fishers’ embodied experiences and knowledge claims remain
beyond both articulation and access as acceptable political
narratives. In other words, they are ‘excess’ in terms of the
politics of marine resource access, which excludes embodied
understandings about human-environment relations inconsis-
tent with hegemonic narratives about patrimony.
Studying fishers’ and the oil industry’s
knowledge in Tabasco
The study is based on 4,5 months of ethnographic fieldwork
within Tabascan fisher communities and 2 months among oil-
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industrial and governmental actors on the coast and in
Tabasco’s capital, Villahermosa, in 2011–12 and 2017.
During this time, I lived with the family of a political leader
among the sea fishers, and later with an unlicensed fisher. The
fieldwork involved participation in, and observation of, fish-
ing activities among three fisher families and several groups of
unlicensed fishers in the river delta, along the coastline and
10 km offshore, in the course of 13 fishing trips which lasted
from 4 to 10 h. During these trips, I either participated by
helping to row or was merely a passenger, meanwhile observ-
ing the use of gill nets, throw nets and long lines, and the
fishing of gafftopsail catfish, red snapper, snook and tilapia,
among others. In addition, I observed onshore fishing-related
activities from the making of fishing nets to the cleaning and
selling of the catch.
Fieldwork included participation in meetings with fisher
leaders, fishers, the oil industry and the government. Topics
addressed in these meetings included the monitoring of and
negotiation over the implementation of compensation that oil
companies paid to fishers. Participation in the fishers’ lives
provided insights into their daily fishing activities, social net-
works and political strategies. This part of the study included
20 ethnographic interviews and 40 informal conversations
with fishers, as well as 25 interviews with oil industry and
government representatives. A review of governmental poli-
cies and documents of a court case involving contamination
caused by PEMEX in fisher and farmer communities also
informed this study. Access to the complex networks of
Mexican fish-and-oil politics required time and considerable
flexibility in empirical data collection. The sensitivity of the
research topic, and the politically tense relations between the
oil industry, government authorities and different fisher
groups, required considerable negotiation to build trust and
protect the informants’ anonymity.
Tabasco’s coastal areas are home to lagoons and a river
delta which, together with the vast offshore area, provide the
environment for a wide range of marine products from coral
reef and marine fish to oysters and crabs. Tabasco’s fishers are
small-scale fishers who are either self-employed or work for
small fishing entrepreneurs. Between the river delta and the
200-km offshore limit, groups of three to five sea fishers,
using nets and long lines, work from open fibreglass motor
boats and wooden kayaks to catch gafftopsail catfish
(bandera), king mackerel, snapper (guachinango, pargo),
snook (robalo) and wahoo (peto) (Mendoza Carranza et al.
2008; Saury Arias 2010: 78–82). Federal statistics on fish
catches indicate a 22% decrease in catches of the most impor-
tant species between 2004 and 2013; these are at best sugges-
tive, however, as they rely on catch reports made by licenced
fishers and exclude catches by unlicensed fishers (INEGI
2014; Saury Arias 2010). Although the number of unlicensed
coastal and offshore small-scale fishers has increased as
campesinos (peasant farmers) have turned to fishing for
subsistence, the total number of small-scale fishers has fallen
from at least 10,000 in 2004 to between 7000 and 8000 in
2014 (Interview with fishing official, 2011; INEGI 2014;
Muñoz-Sánchez and Cruz-Burguete 2013; Saury Arias
2010: 4). These figures are rough estimates based on inter-
views with government fishing officials in 2011, studies and
federal statistics. The decrease in fish catches has taken place
since the federal Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural
Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA) stopped issu-
ing fishing licences to new fishers in the early 1990s, an ini-
tiative justified by an official discourse of conserving fish
populations. Despite the decrease of fisher numbers, however,
most families in coastal areas still depend on fishing for
income.
The communities engaged in fishing are highly het-
erogeneous in terms of their socio-economic circum-
stances and ethnicity, and in their status in the fishers’
political-organisational hierarchies. Of the 7000 to 8000
small-scale fishers who are active in the coastal river
delta, lagoons and offshore, half are unlicensed (pesca-
dores libres)1 while the rest are cooperative fishers or
licence-holding entrepreneurs (permisionários), who do
not usually fish themselves. In addition, many people
move between fishing and farming depending on the
time of year. While most fishers from the coastal com-
munities are mestizos, some riverine fishers speak
Yokot’an2 as their mother tongue (Muñoz-Sánchez and
Cruz-Burguete 2013). Fishers and fishing entrepreneurs
include local fishers, many of whom come from long
lines of fisher families, and mestizo migrants who moved to
Tabasco from Veracruz in the 1980s. Many of the unlicensed
fishers are ex-cooperative members, half of whom now work
under casual arrangements for the wealthier permisionários
while the rest are informal, independent fishers. The
proletarianisation of the fishing communities, the competition
for restricted space and the large number of unlicensed fishers
who have limited political rights inevitably fragment their
political agendas.
Since the Mexican revolution, the state has played a key
role in the development of commercial fishing at every level,
and state management of it continues to be highly centralised
(Greenberg 2006). The federal government actively promoted
cooperative fishing from the 1940s to the early 1980s, during
which time it focused attention on specific species and encour-
aged cooperatives to take big loans, which led to the overex-
ploitation of tuna, for example, and the overcapitalisation of
the fleet (Greenberg 2006). During the 1980s in Tabasco,
1 Based on estimates by a government fishing official (Interview, 2011).
2 The Yokot’an indigenous group, also called Chontal, Maya-chontal or
Maya-putún, is Tabasco’s only indigenous group. The majority of Yokot’ans
live in the municipalities of interior Tabasco. Many of those living in the
coastal municipality of Centla are riverine and lagoon fishers.
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coastal people formed cooperatives to begin working in the
booming offshore shrimp and fish industries (Interview with
environmental NGO 2011). In the 1990s, the Mexican gov-
ernment opened the fishing industry to private investment.
Due to increasing debts, cuts in government subsidies,
overfishing and PEMEX’s operational expansion, fishing suf-
fered, especially the shrimp industry, which eventually col-
lapsed in the 1990s. What remains in Tabasco after the down-
fall of large-scale commercial fisheries are the small-scale
fishers. SAGARPA does not effectively monitor fish popula-
tions or the catch of undersized and seasonally banned fish,
although both are officially its responsibility. Finally, while
Tabasco only accounts for 2.5% of national fish production
(Conapesca 2013), it is Mexico’s biggest producer of red
snapper and the second biggest producer of prawns, oysters
and snook.
Turning to the oil industry, PEMEX, the tenth-largest oil
company in the world and the fourth-largest exporter of crude
oil to the USA (US EIA 2016), has had an active presence in
the everyday life of the coastal communities since it initiated
the development of Tabascan offshore oil reserves in the pe-
riod from 1977 to 1980 (Quist and Nygren 2015: 46). Today,
the giant Sonda de Campeche (Campeche Sound) complex in
the Gulf of Mexico accounts for 53% of Mexico’s oil produc-
tion (García 2017), with over 200 oil-production platforms
and roughly 160 foreign companies operating there as sup-
pliers. In Tabasco, the number of foreign subcontractors and
offshore seismic studies has increased since the early 2000s
and, in 2003, the government imposed security restrictions
near oil installations in the Gulf of Mexico in a 15,907 km2
marine zone of exclusion, established under federal law
Acuerdo Secretarial No. 117 (DO 2003). This was justified
on the grounds of the risk of terrorism and to enhance security.
Yet research suggests that one of its aims seems to have been
to avoid offshore confrontation, thus ensuring undisturbed oil
production (Quist and Nygren 2015).
The wide-scale and long-term environmental impacts of
the oil industry have been well known to the Gulf of
Mexico’s coastal communities since the enormous blowout
of the offshore well Ixtoc in 1979, the world’s third-largest
oil spill, which dumped more than 3.4 million barrels of crude
into the Gulf (Soto et al. 2014). However, in addition to nu-
merous more recent accidents such as the blowout of the
Ucumacinta oil well in 2007 and accidents occurring during
seismic studies, it is the accumulation of smaller-scale, every-
day contamination that characterises local experiences of liv-
ing with oil’s environmental risks. The sheer infrastructural
presence of the industry also complicates the mobility and
livelihoods of fishers, who are obliged to avoid getting in
the way of the oil industry’s boats, and to be wary of tearing
fishing nets on the network of ducts placed uncovered on the
seabed in the Gulf’s shallow waters (Arias Rodríguez and
Ireta Guzmán 2009; El Expreso de Campeche 2016).
Hunters and prey
Among Tabascan fishers, mobility requires toughness, a tacit
understanding of the environment, technical skills and smooth
cooperation among boat crews. Daily narratives about fishing
portray fisherfolk through tropes evoking mobility and free-
dom regarding fish, the marine environment and fishing gear.
To highlight their ‘fisherness’, men spoke to me with affection
and knowledge about certain difficult-to-reach offshore ridges
and branches of rivers where they customarily fished or stayed
overnight during long trips. Their narrative accounts portrayed
Tabascan men’s territories, claimed through decades of mov-
ing around offshore, and their knowledge of these waters con-
strued places to which generation after generation of fishers
returned. Knowledge about and affection for the sea were thus
intimately bound up with fishers’ daily moving across it
(Ingold 2011).
It was clear that the fishers felt that these places in and
around the water belonged to them and were integral to their
identity. Their sense of ownership also involved a nationalist
sentiment reflecting the number of foreign oil workers who
were now occupying many of these areas. Thus, while fishers
often said that they did not mind sharing the sea space with
fishers from neighbouring states because they knew the others
came ‘por necesidad’ (due to necessity), they spoke resentful-
ly about the white foreigners who worked for offshore oil
companies with salaries much higher than those of Mexican
workers, referring to them as gringos.
One of the yearly highlights of coastal fishing was the night
fishing for robalo machín (snook) in the river delta. This event
drew fisherfolk from all the riverine villages in November and
December to meet the schools of snook en route from
spawning in the freshwater lagoons back to the sea. On these
nights, queues of up to 50 boats formed, waiting for their turn
to throw their net, allowing the current to transport it a few
hundred metres towards the sea before dragging it in. I under-
took one of these quiet, nightly fishing trips with two unli-
censed fishers 2 months after a fatal offshore accident that had
taken place during a storm on a foreign company’s vessel
carrying out seismic studies off the coast. While we queued
to throw our net, the two fishers wondered whether the com-
pany was going to restart work after the accident or wind
down its operations: ‘The gringos must be afraid of us, as they
are going home,’ the young men joked assertively (Author’s
fieldnotes, 2011). The joking heightened the sense of being
part of the water space, of belonging to it and owning it. It
communicated a masculine, protective relationship with the
river that did not welcome actors who competed for space
with fishers.
Those who could still afford to travel offshore beyond the
restricted zones usually spent 3 to 5 days on their fishing trips.
Manymen who fished close to the Campeche Sound area with
its coral reefs sought a ridge called Cayo Arcas, located in
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shallow waters over a hundred kilometres from Tabasco’s
coastline, to rest and gain shelter from storms. According to
fishers, this ridge, which, due to surrounding reef hazards, was
very difficult to reach, and the unbound sea belonged to la
zona de los pescadores (the fishers’ zone). Before the intro-
duction of restrictions on movement in the Gulf of Mexico,
fishers had been allowed to fish freely around marine oil plat-
forms and to take shelter near the rigs and near Cayo Arcas.
But due to the ridge’s strategic proximity to the huge
Campeche Sound oil installations, it has occasionally been
closed off to fishers, leading to disputes. Illegal access to
zones of exclusion incurs a fine of 200 pesos per violation,
and if a fisher is caught three times, his boat is confiscated.
However, as the Gulf lacked effective surveillance, many fish-
ers defied the restrictions.
Much as dwelling (Ingold 2000) in the marine environment
is what makes the fishers, the technology of fishing also plays
an important role (Pálsson 1994). Fishing requires the swift
collaboration of two to five people operating long lines, nets,
motors, boats and a radio, drawing on their tacit, bodily
knowledge of their equipment and the sea. The good manage-
ment of fishing gear and boats is a source of pride, and those
who took me out on their boats often spoke disparagingly
about those whom they did not consider ‘proper’ fishers be-
cause they lacked skill, ambition or a sense of responsibility
towards maintaining nets, motors and storage space for caught
fish. In a conversation about lending equipment to young,
inexperienced fishers, two unlicensed sea fishers discussed
the issue of responsibility:
Rodrigo: How could he think I would lend my motor to
somebody who is just a kid?I have never lent my motor
to anyone! I only trust myself! The responsibility for it is
MINE.
Arturo: If I am the patrón de lancha (skipper), I do not
give the boat to just anybody.
Rodrigo: Me neither. The day you do it and something
happens, you are responsible. Why would I give my
boat to a kid, who is just a KID, who does not have
any skill? If he falls in the water, he will drown.
(Group interview with unlicensed sea fishers, 2012)
The conversation resonates with popular Mexican narra-
tives about equipment as inalienable patrimony, passed from
one generation to the next and securing the continuity of pat-
rimonial communities by uniting fathers and sons (see Quist
and Rinne 2017). However, the discussion about responsibil-
ity highlights especially the necessity to survive by remaining
mobile; securing equipment, and hence mobility and liveli-
hood, is primarily a question of securing life.
The pride in being a fisher, however, was perhaps most
forcefully expressed in the way fishers traversed the sea by
‘turning into’ marine creatures themselves. The silent
language of their movements as they directed the boat towards
the horizon of oil platforms, operated the throw nets near the
river delta’s mangroves, and put on their masks and flippers to
catch lagoon fish, expressed courage and affinity for their way
of life. During their fishing operations, they spoke about fish
as if of their peers. Hence, during a nightly fishing trip along
the coast to catch cinta (cutlass fish) with nets and long lines,
fishers laughed in amazement at the dozens of fish that sur-
faced as if dancing, passing fond comments on their unusual
numbers and funny tricks, suggesting they felt the coming of a
storm (Author’s fieldnotes, 2012).
Sometimes fishers also communicated information about
themselves by joking about their catch. Álvaro, an elder fisher,
for example, claimed that the meat of the long, alligator-like
pejelagarto (tropical gar) worked like Viagra. Curiously, the
pejelagarto is unique to the Tabasco River delta ecosystem,
and, according to studies, has remained relatively unchanged
since it appeared over a hundred million years ago in the
Cretaceous period (Spitzer 2015). Álvaro’s claimed knowl-
edge about the pejelagarto, although expressed jokingly, im-
plies a special connection between fishers and the predator-
prey which inhabits only their waters (and is a delicacy in
Tabasco). It seemed as if he was positing a parallel between
hunter and prey, both masculine and place-bound.
Through these everyday practices and stories about fish spe-
cies, fishing items and important places, small-scale fishers
construed them as part of their biographies of becoming and
being fishers. Yet because of their intensively embodied and
affective character, these human-environment entanglements
cannot be fully verbalised. Thus, they exceed the frames of
acceptable political discourse, occupying less visible margins
within the constituting of theGulf ofMexico as a sacrifice zone.
The fishers’ profound affinity with their lifeworld would be
expressed in passing remarks, such as when Álvaro commented
tome that, unlike oil, which would one day come to an end, fish
would always continue to exist. His comment highlighted both
his pride in mastering a livelihood and way of life nearly as old
as humankind, and a faith among fishers in its future.
Politics of sacrifice
After the privatisation of PEMEX in 2014, in the aftermath of
President Enrique Peña Nieto’s election, the state narrative of
‘development’ in the name of oil as patrimony has become
harder to defend to Mexicans. In Tabasco, however, although
more than three decades of oil extraction has decreasedmarine
biodiversity, reduced fish catches and slowly destroyed coco-
nut cultivations and small-scale agricultural land along the
coast (see also Arroyo and Zalik 2016: 136–137), there are
few legislative avenues for environmental activism.
Within Mexico’s environmental legislation, rewritten when
the oil industry was privatised, oil is prioritised over marine
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ecology. The new National Agency for Industrial Safety and
Environmental Protection for the Oil and Gas Industry,
ASEA, created after the privatisation, lacks comprehensive
legislation regarding marine-environmental contamination
(Gobierno de México 2016; Sellers 2016). Furthermore, ac-
cording to an environmental NGO, public hearings, regulated
by the law, on projects to be carried out in the coastal zones are
often not organised, regardless of coastal communities’ de-
mands for them (Consejo Ciudadano por el agua del estado
de Tabasco 2014: 10–11). These and a concurrent withdraw-
ing of resources for local monitoring make it impossible to
prevent environmental disasters.
Because the environmental legislation regulating the re-
sponsibility for the oil industry’s marine-environmental im-
pacts lacks effective mechanisms that enable the monitoring
of the impacts, it is extremely difficult for fisher communities
to obtain legal recognition of, and compensation for, harmful
impacts on their livelihoods. A class action law introduced in
2012, which was considered a modest victory by Mexico’s
environmental NGOs, apparently made it possible for groups
of at least 30 people to raise class action claims for environ-
mental damage caused by the oil industry. Soon after its intro-
duction, a group of fishers and small-scale farmers from the
interior of Tabasco used it as a basis for suing PEMEX, its
subsidiaries and the government institutes involved for dam-
age caused to the environment, residential buildings and local
livelihoods (Asociación Ecológica Santo Tomás 2013; Inter
Press Service 2013). In 2017, however, the Tabascan judge
presiding over the case concluded that as the law only provid-
ed that ‘authorities with judicial power to commit unilateral
acts’ could be sued, and as PEMEX was not considered such
an authority, PEMEX could not be held legally responsible for
environmental damage. Instead, the judge cited the environ-
mental authority PROFEPA (i.e. the federal prosecutor for
environmental protection) for failure to inspect and oversee
PEMEX’s activities, recognised the fishers and farmers affect-
ed as entitled to legal protection against environmental harm,
and ordered PROFEPA to repair the damage (State of Tabasco
2017). Whether the judgement will actually lead to the resto-
ration of affected soils, buildings and livelihoods, and whether
it represents a shift in the politics of the oil industry’s environ-
mental impacts, remains to be seen.
In this legislative context, and given the inability of science
to establish clear causal relationships to explain the decrease
in fish populations, extra-legal politics has gained heightened
relevance. Although various state instruments from the federal
environmental protection agency (SEMARNAT), PROFEPA
and Tabasco state secretariats are involved in the evaluation of
harm and negotiations over compensation, the legislation re-
quires no involvement of a non-state entity, leaving the fishers
unsupported. Fishers’ evidence of oil spills is studied by
PROFEPA and private laboratories hired by the oil industry,
while impacts of seismic studies, which are often more
difficult to prove, are reported by the oil industry to be studied
by the industry itself.
When asked in interviews about the impacts of oil spills on
the marine ecosystem and fishers, representatives of oil com-
panies usually denied the veracity of spill claims, referring to
studies produced by the oil industry, discussing natural effects
of oil in the offshore, and suggesting that fishers systematical-
ly fabricated evidence.
We carry out various studies and preventive activities.
There are no harmful impacts. On the contrary, people
are grateful that we are here. We have given them boat
motors and fishing equipment but they always want
more (laughs). (Interview with PEMEX representative,
2012)
In the case of damaged fishing nets, they may have been
impregnated with crude. Another possibility is that there
have been emanations of oil that have occurred natural-
ly. So, when there are natural emanations, the crude
usually moves away from the coast. But when there’s
a storm, the crude is swept close to the coast, damaging
fishing nets. (Interview with PEMEX representative,
2011)
One needs to have caution, because the fishers stain
them [fishing nets] with crude. (Interview with
PEMEX representative, 2012)
As with their denials of damage to the nets, oil industry
representatives made dubious claims about the impacts of
seismic studies, suggesting that the evidence was flimsy.
Generally, three-dimensional offshore seismic studies are car-
ried out by ‘gunboats’. The studies involve a time-consuming
laying of registering cables equipped with hydrophones on the
seabed with the help of ‘cable boats’. After the cables are
placed, fast-moving gunboats drive over the cables, shooting
compressed air at them. The hydrophones register the poten-
tial existence of subsoil deposits of oil. I asked David, a boat
mechanic working with a subcontractor company’s gunboats,
if people working on the gunboats ever saw dead fish coming
up to the surface as a result of seismic shooting. He said the
shooting always begins with what in the oil industry is called a
‘soft start’, meaning that the volume of shots grows sequen-
tially. According to him, it allows fish to move away without
being killed (Author’s fieldnotes, 2011). Presenting a slightly
contradictory narrative, a representative of the same company
later claimed that fish do not even swim off:
About the issue of scaring fish away: we even had a
fisher go with us on a boat ahead of the gunboat, and
what we saw was that the fish were not swimming off.
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(Interview with a representative of a subcontractor com-
pany in charge of offshore seismic studies, 2012)
A representative of PEMEX placed the discussion on
seismic studies in the wider context of decreased marine
species:
The species living on the seabed such as shrimp and
oyster would be the first to be affected by seismic stud-
ies. But the effect is not only caused by the seismics. It is
often the shrimping boats. And the decrease is also be-
cause the resource has been over-exploited; many stud-
ies prove it. It is not only because of the oil industry.
(Interview with PEMEX representative, 2012)
In the same interview, the representative sought to avoid
discussing the impacts of seismology by referring to
shrimping as environmentally harmful, which has indeed been
recognised by scientists. Nevertheless, his statement, and his
use of the words ‘also’ and ‘not only’, puts the blame partially
on shrimpers but does not deny the complicity of the oil in-
dustry in reducing the Gulf’s biodiversity. This statement does
not address the actual complexity of interrelations between
different causal factors and fish populations.
Along similar lines, governmental actors interviewed in the
course of fieldwork generally discussed the sustainability of
commercial fishing as if separate from its relations with the oil
industry. According to one official, the primary mission of the
federal agency SAGARPA, which regulates fishing licences
across the whole of Mexico, was securing limits to fishing, as
it ‘cannot keep growing like a snowball’ (Interview in 2012).
Hence, the most recent legislative tools (DOF 2012, DOF
2014a, 2014b) published by the federal government for the
regulation of fishing require a decrease in the size of shrimp-
trawlers and a ban on increasing the catches of red snapper,
shrimp and crabs (langosta, jaiba) until an ongoing study of
their populations has been carried out, the last studies having
been conducted from 2005 to 2007. However, as a Tabasco
state official confirmed, in terms of effect, regulation is highly
centralised and lacks funds for inspection and monitoring.
Finally, these politics of intensified hydrocarbons and sea-
food extraction rely on sacrificing the Gulf area and its diverse
inhabitants to the national economic interest (Arroyo and
Zalik 2016). According to Álvaro, ‘the oil companies have
not given anything but misery to the people in the Gulf of
Mexico’ (Interview, 2017). In the current context of economic
recession due to the drop in oil prices, the federal state has
taken up the narrative of reactivating Tabasco’s coastal econ-
omies through more effective exploitation of the Gulf’s fish-
eries in 2017. However, the potential reopening of fishing
areas as a concession seems to sidestep the issue of assessment
of the long-term environmental impacts of the oil industry.
Claims about the disappearance of fish
Among fishers, knowledge claims about the relationship be-
tween fishing and oil emerged from the everyday life experi-
ence of the aquatic spaces where fishers moved, as described
above. The fishers were all certain that the oil industry was the
cause of decreasing fish catches, but their explanations of how
the industry impacted on fish varied. Their knowledge was
based on first-hand evidence and deduction, and it often in-
cluded gaps. The diverse groups of fishers who plied the river
delta, coastal lagoons and offshore spaces often discussed the
migration of fish species away from their former habitats.
Álvaro, the leader of the sea fishers, resented the fact that
while many other states with a coastline had a CRIP (Centro
Regional de Investigación Pesquera, Regional Centre for
Fishery Studies) for the purpose of studying aquatic life, the
federal authorities had not granted Tabasco its own, which
would have been useful for investigating the disappearance
of fish. Sea fishers I interviewed remembered the days when
fishing trips used to yield 20 tons of different varieties of
snapper.
José: Now in order to catch snapper we need to travel 45
to 50 nautical miles, or more.
Manuel: 70 miles.
Juan: The fish are moving further out, further out. They
are being depleted! Something’s going on.
José: We have to move to new places because here our
past way of life is finished. (Group interview with unli-
censed sea fishers, 2012)
Different fishers suggested that the emigración and
desaparición (migration and disappearance) of species was
related to oil spills, sometimes to climate change and
overfishing, but especially to the increasing seismological
studies carried out along the coast, which were both killing
fish and driving them away.
Diego: There was a lot of trout, fat snook, common
snook, horse mackerel, cutlass fish here, but they
[PEMEX] bombed along the coast and the fish died.
Liina-Maija: How do you know that the fish die because
of PEMEX?
Diego: Because the bomb breaks its… [covers his ears].
But PEMEX says the bombing has no effect on fish.
(Interview with the leader of a cooperative, 2011)
Similarly, an unlicensed sea fisher, Antón, said he had seen
how the detonations ‘make fish grab air inside themselves and
die’ (Author’s fieldnotes, 2012). Another unlicensed fisher,
Matías, who was active in the river delta and along the coast-
line, said, ‘During the time that I’ve been fishing here, we do
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not know where the fish go, but I tell you it is because this
company [referring to a private subcontractor] is working
there. They went dynamiting there, which scares the fish off-
shore, and here at the coast there are none’ (Author’s
fieldnotes, 2011). A retired third-generation fisher and former
leader of fishers, Rogelio, remembered the abundance of
shrimp, snook, gar and especially shark in the river delta and
the coast: ‘There used to be plenty of shark from January to
July. They disappeared because of the noise. The shark is very
sensitive to noise’ (Interview, 2012). In my discussions with
Álvaro, he said that fish driven away by seismological studies
take 5 years to return to their habitats.
However, the narratives were not only about what fishers
thought were the causes of fish displacement; they also
reflected how they felt about their own unjust marginalisation
by the politics of sacrifice. As an elderly unlicensed fisher,
Rubén, who fished along the coast, said, ‘Well, the port offi-
cials and the companies order us to give them space, but we
cannot because that area is where the fish take refuge’
(Interview, 2011).
Many of the sea fishers who fished far offshore had seen oil
spills, but Álvaro said fishers were usually able to avoid catch-
ing contaminated fish; its smell was an easy indicator of
whether it had been in contact with oil. However, many
claimed that the oil industry also damaged their fishing equip-
ment. Fishing nets got torn by passing oil industry boats and
by PEMEX’s petroleum cables located in the Gulf’s shallow
waters. Nets were also seen to be spoiled by leaks from oil
platforms and tubes: ‘Earlier, fishing equipment lasted three,
four years; today only six months’ (Author’s fieldnotes, 2011).
As for the controversial question of overfishing, the fisher
leaders’ response was generally to argue that fishing activity
had not increased as such. ‘The truth is that there are more of
us today, but fishing efforts remain the same. There is talk
about overexploitation because PEMEX is taking away our
space’ (Interview with Ricardo, a fisher leader, 2011). The
claim that the number of fishers had grown, however, was in
stark contrast with federal statistics, which indicated the op-
posite. By drawing attention away from harmful fishing prac-
tices in this way, Ricardo highlighted that the harm to fishers
was not caused by fishers themselves but by the oil industry’s
activities and a government that prohibited the catch of black
snook and fat snook, for example, which, as fisher leaders
argued, were actually abundant because they were not
overfished.
Let me explain you about overexploitation. In 1982−83,
there were 105 offshore shrimping ships and 2,500 off-
shore fishing ships in our town. We fished red snapper,
gafftopsail catfish, shrimp, escolar and common snook.
Today we don’t get those quantities. The species have
migrated because of contamination. When there’s an oil
spill, they pour in a powder that makes the petroleum
sink to the seabed. It takes four, five years until the flora
and fauna are renewed. The oil well Ucumacinta ex-
ploded four or five years ago and two million barrels
of oil spilled out … that killed the fish production. The
species migrate. PROFEPA did a study of it but there
was never a result. That’s why we want a study when
there’s an oil spill. (Interview with Álvaro, 2011)
The credibility of Álvaro’s placing the blame on the oil
industry is coloured by his first-hand experience of the effects
of oil-well blowouts. Nonetheless, it is true that there are few
studies on the long-term effects of oil spills in the Gulf of
Mexico (Arroyo and Zalik 2016), although some findings of
dangerous polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and heavy
metals in Campeche Sound’s shrimp species exist (Rendón
von Osten and Villalobos Zapata 2010: 557). Arguments have
also been made by some scientists that oil spills may have
contributed to the collapse of populations of large pink shrimp
in the Gulf of Mexico in the 1980s (Soto et al. 2014).
Unlike the fisher leader Ricardo, many practising fishers
expressed concerns about the increased number of people
fishing. Rogelio said the fishers needed a consciencia
ecológica (environmental awareness) because the government
did not monitor seasonal bans and prohibitions on undersized
fish. Consequently, fishers would need to self-regulate
catches. In practice, however, while some Tabascan fisher
groups do self-regulate in small coastal lagoons (Mendoza
Carranza et al. 2008), in the open sea, where thousands of
fishers operate, regulation has been virtually impossible due
to lack of support from the government. In the current situa-
tion of decreasing catches, overfishing may indeed be on the
rise. This, however, does not rule out the possibility that the oil
industry is the main cause of diminished catches.
The everyday narratives about oil, seismology and
overfishing quoted above were recounted by diverse individ-
ual fishers and their leaders. They constitute a common claim
about the overall effects of oil and seismology, despite fishers
often being unaware or divided about how exactly technolo-
gies and marine ecosystems interact. In line with Ingold’s
(2011) theoretical ideas about movement, the fishers’ claims
were rooted in a way of life based on following fish to their
shifting habitats and a sense of affinity with the catch. My
fieldwork with the fishers suggests that their ways of articu-
lating their tacit knowledge of the ecosystem were linguisti-
cally inadequate for political claim-making, especially as
much of the knowledge appeared as a mix of inarticulate,
embodied everyday practice and affects. However, it was ex-
actly the everyday entanglement with their sea environment
that constituted the fishers’ identity. As I will show below, the
fishers’ knowledges were excluded from mainstream dis-
courses by law and politics, which favoured the oil industry.
Corresponding with de la Cadena’s theorisation (2015), the
fishers’ knowledges and relations with the environment
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extended beyond politics because they did not conform to the
divide between nature and culture accepted by formal politics.
In order to formulate claims over rights to their sea envi-
ronment, therefore, fisher leaders were forced to relate to pop-
ular and state narratives about oil as patrimony. (For further
analysis of these claims, see Quist and Rinne 2017.) These
narratives, together with state politics of oil, subsume ideas
about the inevitability of environmental degradation. Thus,
when the newspapers report on environmental contamination
and social harms caused by the oil industry as unjust but
unavoidable sacrifice due to the impunity of the oil industry,
they reshape the fishers’ claims as claims over patrimony
(Quist and Rinne 2017). Correspondingly, government and
oil industry officials highlighted the economic necessity of
the paraestatal PEMEX regardless of wide-scale contamina-
tion and harm to local livelihoods.
The pressure to acknowledge PEMEX’s importance as an
‘engine of development’ and symbol of patrimonial assets was
reflected in Álvaro’s and other fisher leaders’ narratives. The
leaders made it clear that they were pressured to ‘know’ that
from the point of view of Mexicans, PEMEX was the primary
concern, but also claimed that its coexistence with fish-
ers had to be made possible (Quist and Rinne 2017). In
their everyday lives fishers seldom referred to patrimo-
ny, but rather posited access to the environment as a
right to a particular way of life and to dignity. This
understanding, however, did not inform the collective
political claims formulated by fisher leaders. Rather,
the legislative-political setup incentivised fishers to pres-
ent their case in terms of economic value, which could
not represent the rich meanings they associated with the
sea space. Hence, while fishers themselves, through
their daily discourse and practice, expressed mobility
in, and intimacy with, the sea environment as a way
of life, fishers’ political leaders like Álvaro operated
as mediators who translated this excess into political narra-
tives about patrimony and economic value, which were ac-
ceptable in the arenas of Tabasco’s environmental governance,
in which rendering the oil production zone as a sacrifice was
portrayed as imperative.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued for recognising that fishers’ prac-
tices and narratives of following fish—underpinned by their
understandings of marine ecology, seismology and oil—
cannot be articulated into political narratives, despite having
political relevance. Commonly, political ecologies of oil and
ethnographic studies of maritime livelihoods do not examine
the complex relations between fishing and the oil industry. I
have shown that the fishers’movements through offshore and
coastal environments, and their narratives of their
understandings of the disappearance of marine species, reflect
how the ‘world’ of diverse fisherfolk both communicates
with, and exceeds, narratives recognisable within the politics
of offshore access. At the same time, these politics, in which
legislation is operationalised for the intensified extraction of
offshore oil, shape the Gulf of Mexico and its diverse inhab-
itants as a sacrifice zone. The sacrifice of less valuable forms
of life to serve the common good reflects historical state nar-
ratives of oil as patrimony, and is further enabled through the
scientific indeterminacy of oil’s impacts on fish. In order to
make my claims, I have drawn upon ethnographic research
among different fishers and their political leaders, and oil in-
dustry and government actors, as well as government docu-
ments, to show fishers’ less visible ecological practices in the
context of the sacrifice zone.
The fishers’ livelihood practices are essentially based on
mobility. In the everyday of fishing, Tabasco’s diverse riverine
and sea fishers constitute themselves as free and mobile
hunters through their closeness with environment, fishing
equipment and fish species. Their narratives and embodied
practices reflect this entanglement with the sea environment.
The everyday claims of fishers about seismology, oil and
the disappearance of fish reflect their perspective on their own
marginalisation within marine environmental governance.
While fishers ‘know’ the oil industry is the principal cause
of their decreased catches, they have diverging understandings
about the relations between seismology, hydrocarbons and
marine ecosystems. In fisher leaders’ efforts to defend access
to their fishing grounds in the Gulf, this knowledge is
reshaped into claims that acknowledge oil as patrimony while
demanding the right to fishers’ coexistence with the industry.
However, the fishers’ own conceptions of identity, intertwined
with their relations with the fish, remain beyond political nar-
ratives.Meanwhile, among practising fishers, many access the
prohibited offshore zones in any case, thereby defying
sanctions.
My analysis of fishers and the oil industry in light of de la
Cadena’s (2015) and Lerner’s (2010) ideas shows how atten-
tion to lifeworlds goes beyond political narratives and pro-
vides a lens that brings into focus less visible politics
concerning the environment. It also suggests that interpreting
extractive governance as the production of sacrifice zones
highlights how this logic is not unique to Tabasco, but under-
lies the extraction-based economy globally.
In this article, I have sought to discuss divergence and
excess by also showing that perceptions which are not
recognised in politics prompt the fisher leaders’ labour of
translation. In other words, the leaders are rendered sub-
ordinate to politics that reflect the logic of sacrificing
fish and fishing to patrimony and development and
make inevitable the emergence of fisher political leaders
who acknowledge oil as patrimony and defend the value
of fishing in economic terms.
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